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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*-
 *
 * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
 * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
 * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */

#include "nsNSSCallbacks.h"

#include "PSMRunnable.h"
#include "ScopedNSSTypes.h"
#include "SharedCertVerifier.h"
#include "SharedSSLState.h"
#include "mozilla/ArrayUtils.h"
#include "mozilla/Assertions.h"
#include "mozilla/Casting.h"
#include "mozilla/RefPtr.h"
#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
#include "mozilla/Unused.h"
#include "nsContentUtils.h"
#include "nsICertOverrideService.h"
#include "nsIHttpChannelInternal.h"
#include "nsIPrompt.h"
#include "nsISupportsPriority.h"
#include "nsIStreamLoader.h"
#include "nsITokenDialogs.h"
#include "nsIUploadChannel.h"
#include "nsIWebProgressListener.h"
#include "nsNSSCertHelper.h"
#include "nsNSSCertificate.h"
#include "nsNSSComponent.h"
#include "nsNSSIOLayer.h"
#include "nsNetUtil.h"
#include "nsProtectedAuthThread.h"
#include "nsProxyRelease.h"
#include "nsStringStream.h"
#include "pkix/pkixtypes.h"
#include "ssl.h"
#include "sslproto.h"

#include "TrustOverrideUtils.h"
#include "TrustOverride-SymantecData.inc"
#include "TrustOverride-AppleGoogleDigiCertData.inc"
#include "TrustOverride-TestImminentDistrustData.inc"

using namespace mozilla;
using namespace mozilla::pkix;
using namespace mozilla::psm;

extern LazyLogModule gPIPNSSLog;

static void AccumulateCipherSuite(Telemetry::HistogramID probe,
                                  const SSLChannelInfo& channelInfo);

namespace {

// Bits in bit mask for SSL_REASONS_FOR_NOT_FALSE_STARTING telemetry probe
// These bits are numbered so that the least subtle issues have higher values.
// This should make it easier for us to interpret the results.
const uint32_t POSSIBLE_VERSION_DOWNGRADE = 4;
const uint32_t POSSIBLE_CIPHER_SUITE_DOWNGRADE = 2;
const uint32_t KEA_NOT_SUPPORTED = 1;

} // namespace

class OCSPRequest final : public nsIStreamLoaderObserver
                        , public nsIRunnable
{
public:
  OCSPRequest(const nsCString& aiaLocation,
              const OriginAttributes& originAttributes,
              Vector<uint8_t>&& ocspRequest,
              TimeDuration timeout);

  NS_DECL_THREADSAFE_ISUPPORTS
  NS_DECL_NSISTREAMLOADEROBSERVER
  NS_DECL_NSIRUNNABLE

  nsresult DispatchToMainThreadAndWait();
  nsresult GetResponse(/*out*/ Vector<uint8_t>& response);

private:
  ~OCSPRequest() = default;

  static void OnTimeout(nsITimer* timer, void* closure);
  nsresult NotifyDone(nsresult rv, MonitorAutoLock& proofOfLock);

  // mMonitor provides the memory barrier protecting these member variables.
  // What happens is the originating thread creates an OCSPRequest object with
  // the information necessary to perform an OCSP request. It sends the object
  // to the main thread and waits on the monitor for the operation to complete.
  // On the main thread, a channel is set up to perform the request. This gets
  // dispatched to necko. At the same time, a timeout timer is initialized. If
  // the necko request completes, the response data is filled out, mNotifiedDone
  // is set to true, and the monitor is notified. The original thread then wakes
  // up and continues with the results that have been filled out. If the request
  // times out, again the response data is filled out, mNotifiedDone is set to
  // true, and the monitor is notified. The first of these two events wins. That
  // is, if the timeout timer fires but the request completes shortly after, the
  // caller will see the request as having timed out.
  // When the request completes (i.e. OnStreamComplete runs), the timer will be
  // cancelled. This is how we know the closure in OnTimeout is valid. If the
  // timer fires before OnStreamComplete runs, it should be safe to not cancel
  // the request because necko has a strong reference to it.
  Monitor mMonitor;
  bool mNotifiedDone;
  nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamLoader> mLoader;
  const nsCString mAIALocation;
  const OriginAttributes mOriginAttributes;
  const Vector<uint8_t> mPOSTData;
  const TimeDuration mTimeout;
  nsCOMPtr<nsITimer> mTimeoutTimer;
  TimeStamp mStartTime;
  nsresult mResponseResult;
  Vector<uint8_t> mResponseBytes;
};

NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(OCSPRequest, nsIStreamLoaderObserver, nsIRunnable)

OCSPRequest::OCSPRequest(const nsCString& aiaLocation,
                         const OriginAttributes& originAttributes,
                         Vector<uint8_t>&& ocspRequest,
                         TimeDuration timeout)
  : mMonitor("OCSPRequest.mMonitor")
  , mNotifiedDone(false)
  , mLoader(nullptr)
  , mAIALocation(aiaLocation)
  , mOriginAttributes(originAttributes)
  , mPOSTData(std::move(ocspRequest))
  , mTimeout(timeout)
  , mTimeoutTimer(nullptr)
  , mStartTime()
  , mResponseResult(NS_ERROR_FAILURE)
  , mResponseBytes()
{
}

nsresult
OCSPRequest::DispatchToMainThreadAndWait()
{
  MOZ_ASSERT(!NS_IsMainThread());
  if (NS_IsMainThread()) {
    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
  }

  MonitorAutoLock lock(mMonitor);
  nsresult rv = NS_DispatchToMainThread(this);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return rv;
  }
  while (!mNotifiedDone) {
    lock.Wait();
  }

  TimeStamp endTime = TimeStamp::Now();
  // CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_RESULT:
  // 0: request timed out
  // 1: request succeeded
  // 2: request failed
  // 3: internal error
  // If mStartTime was never set, we consider this an internal error.
  // Otherwise, we managed to at least send the request.
  if (mStartTime.IsNull()) {
    Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_RESULT, 3);
  } else if (mResponseResult == NS_ERROR_NET_TIMEOUT) {
    Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_RESULT, 0);
    Telemetry::AccumulateTimeDelta(
      Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_CANCELED_TIME,
      mStartTime, endTime);
  } else if (NS_SUCCEEDED(mResponseResult)) {
    Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_RESULT, 1);
    Telemetry::AccumulateTimeDelta(
      Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_SUCCEEDED_TIME,
      mStartTime, endTime);
  } else {
    Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_RESULT, 2);
    Telemetry::AccumulateTimeDelta(
      Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_FAILED_TIME,
      mStartTime, endTime);
  }
  return rv;
}

nsresult
OCSPRequest::GetResponse(/*out*/ Vector<uint8_t>& response)
{
  MOZ_ASSERT(!NS_IsMainThread());
  if (NS_IsMainThread()) {
    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
  }

  MonitorAutoLock lock(mMonitor);
  if (!mNotifiedDone) {
    return NS_ERROR_IN_PROGRESS;
  }
  if (NS_FAILED(mResponseResult)) {
    return mResponseResult;
  }
  response.clear();
  if (!response.append(mResponseBytes.begin(), mResponseBytes.length())) {
    return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
  }
  return NS_OK;
}

static NS_NAMED_LITERAL_CSTRING(OCSP_REQUEST_MIME_TYPE,
                                "application/ocsp-request");
static NS_NAMED_LITERAL_CSTRING(OCSP_REQUEST_METHOD, "POST");

NS_IMETHODIMP
OCSPRequest::Run()
{
  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
  if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
  }

  MonitorAutoLock lock(mMonitor);

  nsCOMPtr<nsIIOService> ios = do_GetIOService();
  if (!ios) {
    return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock);
  }

  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
  nsresult rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(uri), mAIALocation, nullptr, nullptr,
                          ios);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI, lock);
  }
  nsAutoCString scheme;
  rv = uri->GetScheme(scheme);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }
  if (!scheme.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("http")) {
    return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI, lock);
  }

  nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> channel;
  rv = ios->NewChannel2(mAIALocation,
                        nullptr,
                        nullptr,
                        nullptr, // aLoadingNode
                        nsContentUtils::GetSystemPrincipal(),
                        nullptr, // aTriggeringPrincipal
                        nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_NULL,
                        nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER,
                        getter_AddRefs(channel));
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }

  // Security operations scheduled through normal HTTP channels are given
  // high priority to accommodate real time OCSP transactions.
  nsCOMPtr<nsISupportsPriority> priorityChannel = do_QueryInterface(channel);
  if (priorityChannel) {
    priorityChannel->AdjustPriority(nsISupportsPriority::PRIORITY_HIGHEST);
  }

  channel->SetLoadFlags(nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS |
                        nsIChannel::LOAD_BYPASS_SERVICE_WORKER);

  // For OCSP requests, only the first party domain and private browsing id
  // aspects of origin attributes are used. This means that:
  // a) if first party isolation is enabled, OCSP requests will be isolated
  // according to the first party domain of the original https request
  // b) OCSP requests are shared across different containers as long as first
  // party isolation is not enabled and none of the containers are in private
  // browsing mode.
  if (mOriginAttributes != OriginAttributes()) {
    OriginAttributes attrs;
    attrs.mFirstPartyDomain = mOriginAttributes.mFirstPartyDomain;
    attrs.mPrivateBrowsingId = mOriginAttributes.mPrivateBrowsingId;

    nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = channel->GetLoadInfo();
    if (!loadInfo) {
      return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock);
    }
    rv = loadInfo->SetOriginAttributes(attrs);
    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
      return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
    }
  }

  nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> uploadStream;
  rv = NS_NewByteInputStream(getter_AddRefs(uploadStream),
                             reinterpret_cast<const char*>(mPOSTData.begin()),
                             mPOSTData.length());
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }
  nsCOMPtr<nsIUploadChannel> uploadChannel(do_QueryInterface(channel));
  if (!uploadChannel) {
    return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock);
  }
  rv = uploadChannel->SetUploadStream(uploadStream, OCSP_REQUEST_MIME_TYPE, -1);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }
  // Do not use SPDY for internal security operations. It could result
  // in the silent upgrade to ssl, which in turn could require an SSL
  // operation to fulfill something like an OCSP fetch, which is an
  // endless loop.
  nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannelInternal> internalChannel = do_QueryInterface(channel);
  if (!internalChannel) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }
  rv = internalChannel->SetAllowSpdy(false);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }
  nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> hchan = do_QueryInterface(channel);
  if (!hchan) {
    return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock);
  }
  rv = hchan->SetAllowSTS(false);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }
  rv = hchan->SetRequestMethod(OCSP_REQUEST_METHOD);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }

  rv = NS_NewStreamLoader(getter_AddRefs(mLoader), this);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }

  rv = NS_NewTimerWithFuncCallback(getter_AddRefs(mTimeoutTimer),
                                   OCSPRequest::OnTimeout,
                                   this,
                                   mTimeout.ToMilliseconds(),
                                   nsITimer::TYPE_ONE_SHOT,
                                   "OCSPRequest::Run");
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }
  rv = hchan->AsyncOpen2(this->mLoader);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }
  mStartTime = TimeStamp::Now();
  return NS_OK;
}

nsresult
OCSPRequest::NotifyDone(nsresult rv, MonitorAutoLock& lock)
{
  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
  if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
  }

  if (mNotifiedDone) {
    return mResponseResult;
  }
  mLoader = nullptr;
  mResponseResult = rv;
  if (mTimeoutTimer) {
    Unused << mTimeoutTimer->Cancel();
  }
  mNotifiedDone = true;
  lock.Notify();
  return rv;
}

NS_IMETHODIMP
OCSPRequest::OnStreamComplete(nsIStreamLoader* aLoader,
                              nsISupports* aContext,
                              nsresult aStatus,
                              uint32_t responseLen,
                              const uint8_t* responseBytes)
{
  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
  if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
  }

  MonitorAutoLock lock(mMonitor);

  nsCOMPtr<nsIRequest> req;
  nsresult rv = aLoader->GetRequest(getter_AddRefs(req));
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }

  if (NS_FAILED(aStatus)) {
    return NotifyDone(aStatus, lock);
  }

  nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> hchan = do_QueryInterface(req);
  if (!hchan) {
    return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock);
  }

  bool requestSucceeded;
  rv = hchan->GetRequestSucceeded(&requestSucceeded);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }
  if (!requestSucceeded) {
    return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock);
  }

  unsigned int rcode;
  rv = hchan->GetResponseStatus(&rcode);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
  }
  if (rcode != 200) {
    return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock);
  }

  mResponseBytes.clear();
  if (!mResponseBytes.append(responseBytes, responseLen)) {
    return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, lock);
  }
  mResponseResult = aStatus;

  return NotifyDone(NS_OK, lock);
}

void
OCSPRequest::OnTimeout(nsITimer* timer, void* closure)
{
  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
  if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
    return;
  }

  // We know the OCSPRequest is still alive because if the request had completed
  // (i.e. OnStreamComplete ran), the timer would have been cancelled in
  // NotifyDone.
  OCSPRequest* self = static_cast<OCSPRequest*>(closure);
  MonitorAutoLock lock(self->mMonitor);
  self->mTimeoutTimer = nullptr;
  self->NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_NET_TIMEOUT, lock);
}

mozilla::pkix::Result
DoOCSPRequest(const nsCString& aiaLocation,
              const OriginAttributes& originAttributes,
              Vector<uint8_t>&& ocspRequest,
              TimeDuration timeout,
              /*out*/ Vector<uint8_t>& result)
{
  MOZ_ASSERT(!NS_IsMainThread());
  if (NS_IsMainThread()) {
    return mozilla::pkix::Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT;
  }

  result.clear();
  MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
          ("DoOCSPRequest to '%s'", aiaLocation.get()));

  nsCOMPtr<nsIEventTarget> sts = do_GetService(
    NS_SOCKETTRANSPORTSERVICE_CONTRACTID);
  MOZ_ASSERT(sts);
  if (!sts) {
    return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_STATE;
  }
  bool onSTSThread;
  nsresult rv = sts->IsOnCurrentThread(&onSTSThread);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
  }
  MOZ_ASSERT(!onSTSThread);
  if (onSTSThread) {
    return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_STATE;
  }

  RefPtr<OCSPRequest> request(new OCSPRequest(aiaLocation, originAttributes,
                                              std::move(ocspRequest), timeout));
  rv = request->DispatchToMainThreadAndWait();
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
  }
  rv = request->GetResponse(result);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    if (rv == NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI) {
      return mozilla::pkix::Result::ERROR_CERT_BAD_ACCESS_LOCATION;
    }
    return mozilla::pkix::Result::ERROR_OCSP_SERVER_ERROR;
  }
  return Success;
}

static char*
ShowProtectedAuthPrompt(PK11SlotInfo* slot, nsIInterfaceRequestor *ir)
{
  if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
    NS_ERROR("ShowProtectedAuthPrompt called off the main thread");
    return nullptr;
  }

  char* protAuthRetVal = nullptr;

  // Get protected auth dialogs
  nsCOMPtr<nsITokenDialogs> dialogs;
  nsresult nsrv = getNSSDialogs(getter_AddRefs(dialogs),
                                NS_GET_IID(nsITokenDialogs),
                                NS_TOKENDIALOGS_CONTRACTID);
  if (NS_SUCCEEDED(nsrv))
  {
    nsProtectedAuthThread* protectedAuthRunnable = new nsProtectedAuthThread();
    if (protectedAuthRunnable)
    {
      NS_ADDREF(protectedAuthRunnable);

      protectedAuthRunnable->SetParams(slot);

      nsCOMPtr<nsIProtectedAuthThread> runnable = do_QueryInterface(protectedAuthRunnable);
      if (runnable)
      {
        nsrv = dialogs->DisplayProtectedAuth(ir, runnable);

        // We call join on the thread,
        // so we can be sure that no simultaneous access will happen.
        protectedAuthRunnable->Join();

        if (NS_SUCCEEDED(nsrv))
        {
          SECStatus rv = protectedAuthRunnable->GetResult();
          switch (rv)
          {
              case SECSuccess:
                  protAuthRetVal = ToNewCString(nsDependentCString(PK11_PW_AUTHENTICATED));
                  break;
              case SECWouldBlock:
                  protAuthRetVal = ToNewCString(nsDependentCString(PK11_PW_RETRY));
                  break;
              default:
                  protAuthRetVal = nullptr;
                  break;
          }
        }
      }

      NS_RELEASE(protectedAuthRunnable);
    }
  }

  return protAuthRetVal;
}

class PK11PasswordPromptRunnable : public SyncRunnableBase
{
public:
  PK11PasswordPromptRunnable(PK11SlotInfo* slot,
                             nsIInterfaceRequestor* ir)
    : mResult(nullptr),
      mSlot(slot),
      mIR(ir)
  {
  }
  virtual ~PK11PasswordPromptRunnable() = default;

  char * mResult; // out
  virtual void RunOnTargetThread() override;
private:
  PK11SlotInfo* const mSlot; // in
  nsIInterfaceRequestor* const mIR; // in
};

void
PK11PasswordPromptRunnable::RunOnTargetThread()
{
  nsresult rv;
  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrompt> prompt;
  if (!mIR) {
    rv = nsNSSComponent::GetNewPrompter(getter_AddRefs(prompt));
    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
      return;
    }
  } else {
    prompt = do_GetInterface(mIR);
    MOZ_ASSERT(prompt, "Interface requestor should implement nsIPrompt");
  }

  if (!prompt) {
    return;
  }

  if (PK11_ProtectedAuthenticationPath(mSlot)) {
    mResult = ShowProtectedAuthPrompt(mSlot, mIR);
    return;
  }

  nsAutoString promptString;
  if (PK11_IsInternal(mSlot)) {
    rv = GetPIPNSSBundleString("CertPassPromptDefault", promptString);
  } else {
    NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 tokenName(PK11_GetTokenName(mSlot));
    const char16_t* formatStrings[] = {
      tokenName.get(),
    };
    rv = PIPBundleFormatStringFromName("CertPassPrompt", formatStrings,
                                       ArrayLength(formatStrings),
                                       promptString);
  }
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return;
  }

  nsString password;
  // |checkState| is unused because |checkMsg| (the argument just before it) is
  // null, but XPConnect requires it to point to a valid bool nonetheless.
  bool checkState = false;
  bool userClickedOK = false;
  rv = prompt->PromptPassword(nullptr, promptString.get(),
                              getter_Copies(password), nullptr, &checkState,
                              &userClickedOK);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !userClickedOK) {
    return;
  }

  mResult = ToNewUTF8String(password);
}

char*
PK11PasswordPrompt(PK11SlotInfo* slot, PRBool /*retry*/, void* arg)
{
  RefPtr<PK11PasswordPromptRunnable> runnable(
    new PK11PasswordPromptRunnable(slot,
                                   static_cast<nsIInterfaceRequestor*>(arg)));
  runnable->DispatchToMainThreadAndWait();
  return runnable->mResult;
}

static nsCString
getKeaGroupName(uint32_t aKeaGroup)
{
  nsCString groupName;
  switch (aKeaGroup) {
    case ssl_grp_ec_secp256r1:
      groupName = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("P256");
      break;
    case ssl_grp_ec_secp384r1:
      groupName = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("P384");
      break;
    case ssl_grp_ec_secp521r1:
      groupName = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("P521");
      break;
    case ssl_grp_ec_curve25519:
      groupName = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("x25519");
      break;
    case ssl_grp_ffdhe_2048:
      groupName = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("FF 2048");
      break;
    case ssl_grp_ffdhe_3072:
      groupName = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("FF 3072");
      break;
    case ssl_grp_none:
      groupName = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("none");
      break;
    case ssl_grp_ffdhe_custom:
      groupName = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("custom");
      break;
    // All other groups are not enabled in Firefox. See namedGroups in
    // nsNSSIOLayer.cpp.
    default:
      // This really shouldn't happen!
      MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Invalid key exchange group.");
      groupName = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("unknown group");
  }
  return groupName;
}

static nsCString
getSignatureName(uint32_t aSignatureScheme)
{
  nsCString signatureName;
  switch (aSignatureScheme) {
    case ssl_sig_none:
      signatureName = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("none");
      break;
    case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1:
      signatureName = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("RSA-PKCS1-SHA1");
      break;
    case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256:
      signatureName = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("RSA-PKCS1-SHA256");
      break;
    case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384:
      signatureName = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("RSA-PKCS1-SHA384");
      break;
    case  ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512:
      signatureName = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("RSA-PKCS1-SHA512");
      break;
    case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256:
      signatureName = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("ECDSA-P256-SHA256");
      break;
    case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384:
      signatureName = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("ECDSA-P384-SHA384");
      break;
    case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512:
      signatureName = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("ECDSA-P521-SHA512");
      break;
    case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha256:
      signatureName = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("RSA-PSS-SHA256");
      break;
    case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha384:
      signatureName = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("RSA-PSS-SHA384");
      break;
    case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha512:
      signatureName = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("RSA-PSS-SHA512");
      break;
    case ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1:
      signatureName = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("ECDSA-SHA1");
      break;
    case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5:
      signatureName = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("RSA-PKCS1-SHA1MD5");
      break;
    // All other groups are not enabled in Firefox. See sEnabledSignatureSchemes
    // in nsNSSIOLayer.cpp.
    default:
      // This really shouldn't happen!
      MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Invalid signature scheme.");
      signatureName = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("unknown signature");
  }
  return signatureName;
}

// call with shutdown prevention lock held
static void
PreliminaryHandshakeDone(PRFileDesc* fd)
{
  nsNSSSocketInfo* infoObject = (nsNSSSocketInfo*) fd->higher->secret;
  if (!infoObject)
    return;

  SSLChannelInfo channelInfo;
  if (SSL_GetChannelInfo(fd, &channelInfo, sizeof(channelInfo)) == SECSuccess) {
    infoObject->SetSSLVersionUsed(channelInfo.protocolVersion);
    infoObject->SetEarlyDataAccepted(channelInfo.earlyDataAccepted);

    SSLCipherSuiteInfo cipherInfo;
    if (SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channelInfo.cipherSuite, &cipherInfo,
                               sizeof cipherInfo) == SECSuccess) {
      /* Set the SSL Status information */
      RefPtr<nsSSLStatus> status(infoObject->SSLStatus());
      if (!status) {
        status = new nsSSLStatus();
        infoObject->SetSSLStatus(status);
      }

      status->mHaveCipherSuiteAndProtocol = true;
      status->mCipherSuite = channelInfo.cipherSuite;
      status->mProtocolVersion = channelInfo.protocolVersion & 0xFF;
      status->mKeaGroup.Assign(getKeaGroupName(channelInfo.keaGroup));
      status->mSignatureSchemeName.Assign(
        getSignatureName(channelInfo.signatureScheme));
      infoObject->SetKEAUsed(channelInfo.keaType);
      infoObject->SetKEAKeyBits(channelInfo.keaKeyBits);
      infoObject->SetMACAlgorithmUsed(cipherInfo.macAlgorithm);
    }
  }

  // Don't update NPN details on renegotiation.
  if (infoObject->IsPreliminaryHandshakeDone()) {
    return;
  }

  // Get the NPN value.
  SSLNextProtoState state;
  unsigned char npnbuf[256];
  unsigned int npnlen;

  if (SSL_GetNextProto(fd, &state, npnbuf, &npnlen,
                       AssertedCast<unsigned int>(ArrayLength(npnbuf)))
        == SECSuccess) {
    if (state == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED ||
        state == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED) {
      infoObject->SetNegotiatedNPN(BitwiseCast<char*, unsigned char*>(npnbuf),
                                   npnlen);
    } else {
      infoObject->SetNegotiatedNPN(nullptr, 0);
    }
    mozilla::Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_NPN_TYPE, state);
  } else {
    infoObject->SetNegotiatedNPN(nullptr, 0);
  }

  infoObject->SetPreliminaryHandshakeDone();
}

SECStatus
CanFalseStartCallback(PRFileDesc* fd, void* client_data, PRBool *canFalseStart)
{
  *canFalseStart = false;

  nsNSSSocketInfo* infoObject = (nsNSSSocketInfo*) fd->higher->secret;
  if (!infoObject) {
    PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0);
    return SECFailure;
  }

  infoObject->SetFalseStartCallbackCalled();

  PreliminaryHandshakeDone(fd);

  uint32_t reasonsForNotFalseStarting = 0;

  SSLChannelInfo channelInfo;
  if (SSL_GetChannelInfo(fd, &channelInfo, sizeof(channelInfo)) != SECSuccess) {
    return SECSuccess;
  }

  SSLCipherSuiteInfo cipherInfo;
  if (SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channelInfo.cipherSuite, &cipherInfo,
                             sizeof (cipherInfo)) != SECSuccess) {
    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - "
                                      " KEA %d\n", fd,
                                      static_cast<int32_t>(channelInfo.keaType)));
    return SECSuccess;
  }

  // Prevent version downgrade attacks from TLS 1.2, and avoid False Start for
  // TLS 1.3 and later. See Bug 861310 for all the details as to why.
  if (channelInfo.protocolVersion != SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - "
                                      "SSL Version must be TLS 1.2, was %x\n", fd,
                                      static_cast<int32_t>(channelInfo.protocolVersion)));
    reasonsForNotFalseStarting |= POSSIBLE_VERSION_DOWNGRADE;
  }

  // See bug 952863 for why ECDHE is allowed, but DHE (and RSA) are not.
  if (channelInfo.keaType != ssl_kea_ecdh) {
    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - "
                                      "unsupported KEA %d\n", fd,
                                      static_cast<int32_t>(channelInfo.keaType)));
    reasonsForNotFalseStarting |= KEA_NOT_SUPPORTED;
  }

  // Prevent downgrade attacks on the symmetric cipher. We do not allow CBC
  // mode due to BEAST, POODLE, and other attacks on the MAC-then-Encrypt
  // design. See bug 1109766 for more details.
  if (cipherInfo.macAlgorithm != ssl_mac_aead) {
    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
           ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - non-AEAD cipher used, %d, "
            "is not supported with False Start.\n", fd,
            static_cast<int32_t>(cipherInfo.symCipher)));
    reasonsForNotFalseStarting |= POSSIBLE_CIPHER_SUITE_DOWNGRADE;
  }

  // XXX: An attacker can choose which protocols are advertised in the
  // NPN extension. TODO(Bug 861311): We should restrict the ability
  // of an attacker leverage this capability by restricting false start
  // to the same protocol we previously saw for the server, after the
  // first successful connection to the server.

  Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_REASONS_FOR_NOT_FALSE_STARTING,
                        reasonsForNotFalseStarting);

  if (reasonsForNotFalseStarting == 0) {
    *canFalseStart = PR_TRUE;
    infoObject->SetFalseStarted();
    infoObject->NoteTimeUntilReady();
    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] ok\n", fd));
  }

  return SECSuccess;
}

static void
AccumulateNonECCKeySize(Telemetry::HistogramID probe, uint32_t bits)
{
  unsigned int value = bits <   512 ?  1 : bits ==   512 ?  2
                     : bits <   768 ?  3 : bits ==   768 ?  4
                     : bits <  1024 ?  5 : bits ==  1024 ?  6
                     : bits <  1280 ?  7 : bits ==  1280 ?  8
                     : bits <  1536 ?  9 : bits ==  1536 ? 10
                     : bits <  2048 ? 11 : bits ==  2048 ? 12
                     : bits <  3072 ? 13 : bits ==  3072 ? 14
                     : bits <  4096 ? 15 : bits ==  4096 ? 16
                     : bits <  8192 ? 17 : bits ==  8192 ? 18
                     : bits < 16384 ? 19 : bits == 16384 ? 20
                     : 0;
  Telemetry::Accumulate(probe, value);
}

// XXX: This attempts to map a bit count to an ECC named curve identifier. In
// the vast majority of situations, we only have the Suite B curves available.
// In that case, this mapping works fine. If we were to have more curves
// available, the mapping would be ambiguous since there could be multiple
// named curves for a given size (e.g. secp256k1 vs. secp256r1). We punt on
// that for now. See also NSS bug 323674.
static void
AccumulateECCCurve(Telemetry::HistogramID probe, uint32_t bits)
{
  unsigned int value = bits == 256 ? 23 // P-256
                     : bits == 384 ? 24 // P-384
                     : bits == 521 ? 25 // P-521
                     : 0; // Unknown
  Telemetry::Accumulate(probe, value);
}

static void
AccumulateCipherSuite(Telemetry::HistogramID probe, const SSLChannelInfo& channelInfo)
{
  uint32_t value;
  switch (channelInfo.cipherSuite) {
    // ECDHE key exchange
    case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: value = 1; break;
    case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: value = 2; break;
    case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: value = 3; break;
    case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: value = 4; break;
    case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: value = 5; break;
    case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: value = 6; break;
    case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: value = 7; break;
    case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: value = 10; break;
    case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: value = 11; break;
    case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: value = 12; break;
    case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: value = 13; break;
    case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: value = 14; break;
    // DHE key exchange
    case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: value = 21; break;
    case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA: value = 22; break;
    case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: value = 23; break;
    case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA: value = 24; break;
    case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: value = 25; break;
    case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: value = 26; break;
    case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA: value = 27; break;
    case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: value = 28; break;
    case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA: value = 29; break;
    case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: value = 30; break;
    // ECDH key exchange
    case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: value = 41; break;
    case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: value = 42; break;
    case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: value = 43; break;
    case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: value = 44; break;
    case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: value = 45; break;
    case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: value = 46; break;
    // RSA key exchange
    case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: value = 61; break;
    case TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA: value = 62; break;
    case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: value = 63; break;
    case TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA: value = 64; break;
    case SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: value = 65; break;
    case TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: value = 66; break;
    case TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA: value = 67; break;
    // TLS 1.3 PSK resumption
    case TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: value = 70; break;
    case TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: value = 71; break;
    case TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: value = 72; break;
    // unknown
    default:
      value = 0;
      break;
  }
  MOZ_ASSERT(value != 0);
  Telemetry::Accumulate(probe, value);
}

// In the case of session resumption, the AuthCertificate hook has been bypassed
// (because we've previously successfully connected to our peer). That being the
// case, we unfortunately don't know what the verified certificate chain was, if
// the peer's server certificate verified as extended validation, or what its CT
// status is (if enabled). To address this, we attempt to build a certificate
// chain here using as much of the original context as possible (e.g. stapled
// OCSP responses, SCTs, the hostname, the first party domain, etc.). Note that
// because we are on the socket thread, this must not cause any network
// requests, hence the use of FLAG_LOCAL_ONLY.
static void
RebuildVerifiedCertificateInformation(RefPtr<nsSSLStatus> sslStatus,
                                      PRFileDesc* fd,
                                      nsNSSSocketInfo* infoObject)
{
  MOZ_ASSERT(sslStatus);
  MOZ_ASSERT(fd);
  MOZ_ASSERT(infoObject);

  if (!sslStatus || !fd || !infoObject) {
    return;
  }

  UniqueCERTCertificate cert(SSL_PeerCertificate(fd));
  MOZ_ASSERT(cert, "SSL_PeerCertificate failed in TLS handshake callback?");
  if (!cert) {
    return;
  }

  RefPtr<SharedCertVerifier> certVerifier(GetDefaultCertVerifier());
  MOZ_ASSERT(certVerifier,
             "Certificate verifier uninitialized in TLS handshake callback?");
  if (!certVerifier) {
    return;
  }

  // We don't own these pointers.
  const SECItemArray* stapledOCSPResponses = SSL_PeerStapledOCSPResponses(fd);
  const SECItem* stapledOCSPResponse = nullptr;
  // we currently only support single stapled responses
  if (stapledOCSPResponses && stapledOCSPResponses->len == 1) {
    stapledOCSPResponse = &stapledOCSPResponses->items[0];
  }
  const SECItem* sctsFromTLSExtension = SSL_PeerSignedCertTimestamps(fd);
  if (sctsFromTLSExtension && sctsFromTLSExtension->len == 0) {
    // SSL_PeerSignedCertTimestamps returns null on error and empty item
    // when no extension was returned by the server. We always use null when
    // no extension was received (for whatever reason), ignoring errors.
    sctsFromTLSExtension = nullptr;
  }

  int flags = mozilla::psm::CertVerifier::FLAG_LOCAL_ONLY;
  if (!infoObject->SharedState().IsOCSPStaplingEnabled() ||
      !infoObject->SharedState().IsOCSPMustStapleEnabled()) {
    flags |= CertVerifier::FLAG_TLS_IGNORE_STATUS_REQUEST;
  }

  SECOidTag evOidPolicy;
  CertificateTransparencyInfo certificateTransparencyInfo;
  UniqueCERTCertList builtChain;
  const bool saveIntermediates = false;
  mozilla::pkix::Result rv = certVerifier->VerifySSLServerCert(
    cert,
    stapledOCSPResponse,
    sctsFromTLSExtension,
    mozilla::pkix::Now(),
    infoObject,
    infoObject->GetHostName(),
    builtChain,
    saveIntermediates,
    flags,
    infoObject->GetOriginAttributes(),
    &evOidPolicy,
    nullptr, // OCSP stapling telemetry
    nullptr, // key size telemetry
    nullptr, // SHA-1 telemetry
    nullptr, // pinning telemetry
    &certificateTransparencyInfo);

  if (rv != Success) {
    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
            ("HandshakeCallback: couldn't rebuild verified certificate info"));
  }

  RefPtr<nsNSSCertificate> nssc(nsNSSCertificate::Create(cert.get()));
  if (rv == Success && evOidPolicy != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
    sslStatus->SetCertificateTransparencyInfo(certificateTransparencyInfo);
    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
            ("HandshakeCallback using NEW cert %p (is EV)", nssc.get()));
    sslStatus->SetServerCert(nssc, EVStatus::EV);
  } else {
    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
            ("HandshakeCallback using NEW cert %p (is not EV)", nssc.get()));
    sslStatus->SetServerCert(nssc, EVStatus::NotEV);
  }

  if (rv == Success) {
    sslStatus->SetCertificateTransparencyInfo(certificateTransparencyInfo);
    sslStatus->SetSucceededCertChain(std::move(builtChain));
  }
}

static nsresult
IsCertificateDistrustImminent(nsIX509CertList* aCertList,
                              /* out */ bool& isDistrusted) {
  if (!aCertList) {
    return NS_ERROR_INVALID_POINTER;
  }

  nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> rootCert;
  nsCOMPtr<nsIX509CertList> intCerts;
  nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> eeCert;

  RefPtr<nsNSSCertList> certList = aCertList->GetCertList();
  nsresult rv = certList->SegmentCertificateChain(rootCert, intCerts, eeCert);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return rv;
  }

  // Check the test certificate condition first; this is a special certificate
  // that gets the 'imminent distrust' treatment; this is so that the distrust
  // UX code does not become stale, as it will need regular use. See Bug 1409257
  // for context. Please do not remove this when adjusting the rest of the
  // method.
  UniqueCERTCertificate nssEECert(eeCert->GetCert());
  if (!nssEECert) {
    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
  }
  isDistrusted = CertDNIsInList(nssEECert.get(),
                                TestImminentDistrustEndEntityDNs);
  if (isDistrusted) {
    // Exit early
    return NS_OK;
  }

  UniqueCERTCertificate nssRootCert(rootCert->GetCert());
  if (!nssRootCert) {
    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
  }

  // Proceed with the Symantec imminent distrust algorithm. This algorithm is
  // to be removed in Firefox 63, when the validity period check will also be
  // removed from the code in NSSCertDBTrustDomain.
  if (CertDNIsInList(nssRootCert.get(), RootSymantecDNs)) {
    static const PRTime NULL_TIME = 0;

    rv = CheckForSymantecDistrust(intCerts, eeCert, NULL_TIME,
                                  RootAppleAndGoogleSPKIs, isDistrusted);
    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
      return rv;
    }
  }
  return NS_OK;
}

void HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc* fd, void* client_data) {
  SECStatus rv;

  nsNSSSocketInfo* infoObject = (nsNSSSocketInfo*) fd->higher->secret;

  // Do the bookkeeping that needs to be done after the
  // server's ServerHello...ServerHelloDone have been processed, but that doesn't
  // need the handshake to be completed.
  PreliminaryHandshakeDone(fd);

  nsSSLIOLayerHelpers& ioLayerHelpers
    = infoObject->SharedState().IOLayerHelpers();

  SSLVersionRange versions(infoObject->GetTLSVersionRange());

  MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
         ("[%p] HandshakeCallback: succeeded using TLS version range (0x%04x,0x%04x)\n",
          fd, static_cast<unsigned int>(versions.min),
              static_cast<unsigned int>(versions.max)));

  // If the handshake completed, then we know the site is TLS tolerant
  ioLayerHelpers.rememberTolerantAtVersion(infoObject->GetHostName(),
                                           infoObject->GetPort(),
                                           versions.max);

  SSLChannelInfo channelInfo;
  rv = SSL_GetChannelInfo(fd, &channelInfo, sizeof(channelInfo));
  MOZ_ASSERT(rv == SECSuccess);
  if (rv == SECSuccess) {
    // Get the protocol version for telemetry
    // 1=tls1, 2=tls1.1, 3=tls1.2
    unsigned int versionEnum = channelInfo.protocolVersion & 0xFF;
    MOZ_ASSERT(versionEnum > 0);
    Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_HANDSHAKE_VERSION, versionEnum);
    AccumulateCipherSuite(
      infoObject->IsFullHandshake() ? Telemetry::SSL_CIPHER_SUITE_FULL
                                    : Telemetry::SSL_CIPHER_SUITE_RESUMED,
      channelInfo);

    SSLCipherSuiteInfo cipherInfo;
    rv = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channelInfo.cipherSuite, &cipherInfo,
                                sizeof cipherInfo);
    MOZ_ASSERT(rv == SECSuccess);
    if (rv == SECSuccess) {
      // keyExchange null=0, rsa=1, dh=2, fortezza=3, ecdh=4
      Telemetry::Accumulate(
        infoObject->IsFullHandshake()
          ? Telemetry::SSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ALGORITHM_FULL
          : Telemetry::SSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ALGORITHM_RESUMED,
        channelInfo.keaType);

      MOZ_ASSERT(infoObject->GetKEAUsed() == channelInfo.keaType);

      if (infoObject->IsFullHandshake()) {
        switch (channelInfo.keaType) {
          case ssl_kea_rsa:
            AccumulateNonECCKeySize(Telemetry::SSL_KEA_RSA_KEY_SIZE_FULL,
                                    channelInfo.keaKeyBits);
            break;
          case ssl_kea_dh:
            AccumulateNonECCKeySize(Telemetry::SSL_KEA_DHE_KEY_SIZE_FULL,
                                    channelInfo.keaKeyBits);
            break;
          case ssl_kea_ecdh:
            AccumulateECCCurve(Telemetry::SSL_KEA_ECDHE_CURVE_FULL,
                               channelInfo.keaKeyBits);
            break;
          default:
            MOZ_CRASH("impossible KEA");
            break;
        }

        Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_AUTH_ALGORITHM_FULL,
                              channelInfo.authType);

        // RSA key exchange doesn't use a signature for auth.
        if (channelInfo.keaType != ssl_kea_rsa) {
          switch (channelInfo.authType) {
            case ssl_auth_rsa:
            case ssl_auth_rsa_sign:
              AccumulateNonECCKeySize(Telemetry::SSL_AUTH_RSA_KEY_SIZE_FULL,
                                      channelInfo.authKeyBits);
              break;
            case ssl_auth_ecdsa:
              AccumulateECCCurve(Telemetry::SSL_AUTH_ECDSA_CURVE_FULL,
                                 channelInfo.authKeyBits);
              break;
            default:
              MOZ_CRASH("impossible auth algorithm");
              break;
          }
        }
      }

      Telemetry::Accumulate(
          infoObject->IsFullHandshake()
            ? Telemetry::SSL_SYMMETRIC_CIPHER_FULL
            : Telemetry::SSL_SYMMETRIC_CIPHER_RESUMED,
          cipherInfo.symCipher);
    }
  }

  PRBool siteSupportsSafeRenego;
  if (channelInfo.protocolVersion != SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
    rv = SSL_HandshakeNegotiatedExtension(fd, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn,
                                          &siteSupportsSafeRenego);
    MOZ_ASSERT(rv == SECSuccess);
    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
      siteSupportsSafeRenego = false;
    }
  } else {
    // TLS 1.3 dropped support for renegotiation.
    siteSupportsSafeRenego = true;
  }
  bool renegotiationUnsafe = !siteSupportsSafeRenego &&
                             ioLayerHelpers.treatUnsafeNegotiationAsBroken();


  /* Set the SSL Status information */
  RefPtr<nsSSLStatus> status(infoObject->SSLStatus());
  if (!status) {
    status = new nsSSLStatus();
    infoObject->SetSSLStatus(status);
  }

  RememberCertErrorsTable::GetInstance().LookupCertErrorBits(infoObject,
                                                             status);

  uint32_t state;
  if (renegotiationUnsafe) {
    state = nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_BROKEN;
  } else {
    state = nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_SECURE |
            nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_SECURE_HIGH;
    SSLVersionRange defVersion;
    rv = SSL_VersionRangeGetDefault(ssl_variant_stream, &defVersion);
    if (rv == SECSuccess && versions.max >= defVersion.max) {
      // we know this site no longer requires a version fallback
      ioLayerHelpers.removeInsecureFallbackSite(infoObject->GetHostName(),
                                                infoObject->GetPort());
    }
  }

  if (status->HasServerCert()) {
    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
           ("HandshakeCallback KEEPING existing cert\n"));
  } else {
    RebuildVerifiedCertificateInformation(status, fd, infoObject);
  }

  nsCOMPtr<nsIX509CertList> succeededCertChain;
  // This always returns NS_OK, but the list could be empty. This is a
  // best-effort check for now. Bug 731478 will reduce the incidence of empty
  // succeeded cert chains through better caching.
  Unused << status->GetSucceededCertChain(getter_AddRefs(succeededCertChain));
  bool distrustImminent;
  nsresult srv = IsCertificateDistrustImminent(succeededCertChain,
                                               distrustImminent);
  if (NS_SUCCEEDED(srv) && distrustImminent) {
    state |= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_CERT_DISTRUST_IMMINENT;
  }

  bool domainMismatch;
  bool untrusted;
  bool notValidAtThisTime;
  // These all return NS_OK, so don't even bother checking the return values.
  Unused << status->GetIsDomainMismatch(&domainMismatch);
  Unused << status->GetIsUntrusted(&untrusted);
  Unused << status->GetIsNotValidAtThisTime(&notValidAtThisTime);
  // If we're here, the TLS handshake has succeeded. Thus if any of these
  // booleans are true, the user has added an override for a certificate error.
  if (domainMismatch || untrusted || notValidAtThisTime) {
    state |= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_CERT_USER_OVERRIDDEN;
  }

  infoObject->SetSecurityState(state);

  // XXX Bug 883674: We shouldn't be formatting messages here in PSM; instead,
  // we should set a flag on the channel that higher (UI) level code can check
  // to log the warning. In particular, these warnings should go to the web
  // console instead of to the error console. Also, the warning is not
  // localized.
  if (!siteSupportsSafeRenego) {
    NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16 msg(infoObject->GetHostName());
    msg.AppendLiteral(" : server does not support RFC 5746, see CVE-2009-3555");

    nsContentUtils::LogSimpleConsoleError(msg, "SSL",
                                          !!infoObject->GetOriginAttributes().mPrivateBrowsingId);
  }

  infoObject->NoteTimeUntilReady();
  infoObject->SetHandshakeCompleted();
}